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ANALYSIS
The Road to Crimea: Putin’s Foreign Policy Between Reason of State, 
Sovereignty and Bio-Politics
By Philipp Casula, Zurich
Abstract
The Crimean Crisis of 2014 has emphasized once more the troubled relations between Putin’s Russia and 
the West. It has also brought to the fore a lack of understanding of Russia’s foreign policy in the West. Many 
observers are oscillating between disbelief and alarm, trying to figure out Russia’s conduct in foreign affairs 
by referring to imperialism, the Cold War, or to an inherently autocratic character of Russian politics. But 
how special or different are the drivers of Russian foreign policy compared with those of other powers? This 
paper investigates Russia’s foreign policy along three key terms of political history, reason of state, sover-
eignty, and bio-politics, highlighting what they have meant historically and how they are put into practice 
by Russia’s current regime, especially during the Crimean Crisis.
The Ups and Downs in Russia’s Foreign 
Policy Relationship With the West
On March 2, Secretary of State John Kerry commented 
on the Russian de facto take-over of control in Crimea, 
declaring that “you just don’t in the 21st century behave 
in a 19th century fashion by invading another coun-
try on a completely trumped-up pretext.” While Kerry 
was mocked for this statement, since it was too easily 
applicable to the U.S. action against Iraq, the remark 
raises the question of whether, in the 21st century, war 
has really become an unjustifiable means to an end—
at least for the sake of increasing territory, and at least 
within Europe.
Since the Soviet Union’s demise, Russian relations 
with the West have experienced ups and downs. Since 
Putin’s third term, they have steadily deteriorated and 
reached a nadir with the Crimean Crisis of 2014. How-
ever, there has never been an unreservedly pro-West-
ern course in the Russian Federation’s foreign policy, 
at least not since the mid-1990s. It was only during 
Andrey Kozyrev’s tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
that Russia adopted a clear pro-Western stance, aimed 
at maximum integration within Western organizations 
and institutions. During this period, between 1992 and 
1996, Russia largely ignored the other former republics 
of the USSR and followed a path of political, economic, 
and cultural isolationism in the post-Soviet space.1 
Kozyrev advocated the ideas of “returning to civili-
zation” and integration with Europe in a “common 
European home” (a Gorbachevian theme). However, 
this orientation had already started to lose momen-
tum by 1993, with opposition to this course emerging 
within the Yeltsin team itself. Things finally changed 
when Yevgeny Primakov took over the helm at Smo-
lenskaya square in 1996. He is the most well-known 
1 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2013).
representative of the so-called statist tradition of for-
eign policy. From the beginning of his tenure, Prima-
kov sought to establish a relationship with the West 
on an equal footing. His aim was to restore a balance 
of power, and for Russia to be recognized as a great 
power. This trend continued when Vladimir Putin 
assumed the Russian presidency in 1999. Relations 
briefly improved in 2001 in the context of the “war 
on terror”, when Russia and the U.S. closely collabo-
rated on security issues. Moscow politically and logis-
tically supported NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan. 
Generally, however, relations followed a long down-
ward trend, marked by NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia 
(1999), the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (2003), the 2004 
dual enlargement of the EU and NATO, the Orange 
Revolution (2004/05), the planning of a NATO missile 
defense system (2002/2007), and the intervention in 
Libya (2011). In the Kremlin, these events were all per-
ceived as manifestations of the West creeping closer to 
Russia’s borders or as meddling into the affairs of sov-
ereign states irrespective of Moscow’s explicit dissent. 
The anti-Western turn in the mid-2000s culminated 
in Putin’s well-known speech at the Munich Security 
Conference (2007). The aforementioned issues figured 
again in Putin’s speech on March 18, 2014, in which 
he commented on the Crimean Crisis.
Apart from the conclusion of the new START agree-
ment in 2010, the “reset” of U.S.–Russia relations under 
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev soon stalled, and 
relations between Russia and the West in general and the 
U.S. in particular have remained strained during Putin’s 
third term. Disagreements range from the Syrian civil 
war to the fate of whistleblower Edward Snowden. At 
the same time and despite being Russia’s biggest trad-
ing partner, relations with the EU have stagnated (for 
instance, the “Partnership for Modernization”). The 
Crimean Crisis is to be interpreted with these devel-
opments in mind.
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Reason of State From the 17th Century to 
Present-Day Russia
I would like to go one step further than John Kerry 
and argue that Russia’s military intervention in Crimea 
includes elements of a 17th century conception of the 
state and of the use of its military apparatus. This con-
ception goes by the name of raison d’ état (reason of 
state). Reason of state describes, following the famous 
definition by Giovanni Botero, the knowledge neces-
sary to form, preserve, strengthen and expand the state. 
The key question of reason of state is how to achieve the 
state’s preservation, expansion, and felicity.2 In this per-
spective, the state is the sole principle and aim of gov-
ernmental ratio, supplanting the centrality held before-
hand by the prince. Formerly, it had been all about 
securing, preserving and increasing the wealth of the 
sovereign, now it was increasingly the state itself that 
had to be secured and expanded. The state became the 
primary lens through which all given institutions and 
their relations had to be understood. Reason of state 
means the absolute primacy of the state over all other 
concerns. In foreign policy, raison d’ état was concerned 
with seeking and maintaining a balance of power, using 
both war and diplomacy as its key instruments to this 
end. The advent of reason of state also coincides with 
that of mercantilism, which sought to strengthen the 
state’s power through commerce. This logic has never 
completely changed: while reason of state originates in 
the 17th century, it continues to be applied, explicitly or 
implicitly, by all nation-states, not only by Russia, but, 
alas, with different degrees of intensity. When the vital 
interests of a state are at stake, military action can never 
be considered off the table. It remains the ultima ratio 
in international relations.
Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy argue that the state 
is a “mythic entity” in Russia.3 They interpret Vladi-
mir Putin as a statist, a gosudarstvennik or derzhavnik, 
appointed to serve the Russian state and restore its great-
ness. He is, from this perspective, by definition not a sov-
ereign, whose only aim is to preserve his own power, but 
rather an executor of the state’s interests. Putin’s well-
known statement made in 2005 that “the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe 
of the century”, perfectly reflects raison d’ état thinking. 
The demise of the USSR meant a weakening of the Rus-
sian state, of its institutions and of its reach. Restoring 
Russia’s power has been a clearly stated goal of Putin’s 
tenure, from its very beginning. This does not necessar-
2 All following definitions of reason of state, sovereignty, and bio-
politics are adapted from: Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, 
Population (New York: Picador, 2009).
3 Clifford Gaddy and Fiona Hill, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Krem-
lin (Washington: Brookings, 2013).
ily mean (military) expansion, but certainly the end of 
the above-mentioned isolationism vis-à-vis the ex-Soviet 
territory. The Eurasian Economic Union is an expres-
sion of such a striving for closer ties and greater inte-
gration with its neighboring countries. In view of this 
statist thinking, two foreign policy tenets of the current 
leadership come to the fore:
Firstly, a preference for stability over democracy. 
This holds both for domestic and foreign policy. Hence, 
Syria’s Bashar al-Assad is better than a “radical” and 
split opposition, Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovich better 
than “fascists” and nationalists. Official Russia abhors 
any revolutionary scenario. As Boris Kolonitskii com-
mented, “after 23 years apart, Russians and Ukraini-
ans have shaped very different narratives from the same 
Soviet memories. Soviet culture romanticized and sanc-
tified revolution. (…) The very term revolution has come 
to carry negative connotations for Russians.”4 Indeed, 
while Russia’s opposition at first managed to mobi-
lize 50,000 Muscovites to protest against the Krem-
lin’s action in Crimea, now even critical voices such as 
that of Dmitry Bykov, caution against the Maidan pro-
tests, and against revolutions in general.5 The Kremlin 
seems to be a status quo force, whatever the status quo 
is.6 Unless, of course, change is to the advantage of the 
Russian state, as the Crimean case exemplifies.
Secondly, Russia’s official vision of sovereignty 
praises the “Westphalian system” that is based on clearly 
delineated territories and clear spheres of influence that 
do not interfere with each other. Any tipping of the 
international balance of power must be avoided. With 
the West perceived as creeping closer to Russia’s borders, 
even swallowing former satellites, and seen as obstruct-
ing the planned Eurasian Economic Union by integrat-
ing Ukraine through the recently-signed EU–Ukraine 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), 
the Kremlin has interpreted these actions and events as 
destabilizing a balance to the disadvantage of Russia 
and as doing what Hillary Clinton promised in 2012: 
“let’s make no mistake about it [the Eurasian Economic 
Union]. We know what the goal is and we are trying 
to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it.” 
As if replying to Clinton directly, Putin underlined on 
March 18, 2014 that “we understand that these actions 
4 Boris Kolonitskii, “Why Russians Back Putin on Ukraine”, New 
York Times (international edition), 12/03/2014.
5 Dmitry Bykov, “Ukrainian euphoria, patriotic ecstasy on Crimea 
and the spirit of the second revolution,” Sobesednik 11 (2014), 
available at: <http://sobesednik.ru/dmitriy-bykov/20140325-dmi 
triy-bykov-ukrainskaya-eyforiya-patrioticheskiyekstaz-kr>
6 Artemy Magun, “Commentary on Russia and Ukraine”, Telos-
press, 11/03/2014, available at: <http://www.telospress.com/
commentary-on-russia-and-ukraine>
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were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against 
Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived 
to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. 
(…) But we saw no reciprocal steps.” Ultimately, the 
Eurasian Union and the DCFTA can be seen as quasi-
mercantilist means to facilitate economic exchange and 
strengthen Russia and the EU respectively.
Sovereignty from Machiavelli to Putin
The second key term through which I will analyze Rus-
sian foreign policy, is even older than that of reason of 
state. Sovereignty is the key political term of the 16th cen-
tury. Barack Obama alluded to sovereignty in his Brus-
sels speech of March 26, when he described “a more tra-
ditional view of power” according to which “ordinary 
men and women (…) surrender their rights to an all-
powerful sovereign.” Indeed, and in contrast to raison 
d’ état, sovereignty is concerned with the prince and his 
relation to territory. The traditional concern associated 
to sovereignty is that of conquering territories or holding 
on to conquered territory: How can territory be demar-
cated, fixed, secured, or enlarged? The traditional tools 
of sovereignty are laws. Sovereignty is circular in the 
sense that the only goal it proposes is an orderly, lawful 
society. The public good ultimately is obedience to the 
law. What characterizes the goal of sovereignty is noth-
ing else than submission to this law. In an odd way, the 
Putin regime has indeed fulfilled the promise of install-
ing a “dictatorship of law”, with loyal courts sentenc-
ing opponents in politicized trials. This is the domestic 
concern of sovereignty.
On the foreign policy side, the key danger is dis-
possession: hence, sovereignty is not only concerned 
with fending off internal enemies, but likewise external 
ones in order to keep and secure territory. Thus, the two 
aspects of sovereignty which should be highlighted are 
“law” and “territory”. Regarding Russia, the key question 
is what territory is perceived by the Russian leadership as 
relevant for Russia. Is it just the territory of the Russian 
Federation in its current borders? Until recently, respect 
for the Belavezha Accords of 1991 has been a corner-
stone of Russia’s policies in the near abroad.
“Sovereign democracy” was for quite a while a key 
notion used by Russian political leaders to describe the 
Russian system, until the term was dismissed by Med-
vedev in 2006. However, while the term was put aside, 
its meaning and significance were not. The insistence 
on sovereignty meant two things: firstly, that Russia’s 
political system should be considered as a democracy 
sui generis. Secondly, it meant that no country has the 
right to interfere into the internal affairs of any other 
country. Two additional points are especially impor-
tant in this respect:
One, as aptly summarized by Vladimir Putin, is that 
“Russia is an independent, active participant of inter-
national life, and it has, like other countries, national 
interests, which you have to take into account and to 
respect.” According to this rationale, Russia is not any 
other country but a great power with clear spheres of 
influence. This is in line with the classic precepts of sov-
ereignty in terms of a territory, which has to be defended 
and preserved; in terms of Russian territory itself, and 
in terms of spheres of influence.
Two, is the insistence on law: Putin has repeatedly 
accused the West of violating international law and the 
sovereignty of other states, mentioning, of course, Iraq: 
“Our approach is different”, Putin stressed on March 
4, “we proceed from the conviction that we always act 
legitimately. I have personally always been an advocate 
of acting in compliance with international law.” And 
again, on March 18, Putin condemned Russia’s “West-
ern partners”, stressing that they “prefer not to be guided 
by international law in their practical policies, but by 
the rule of the gun. (…) They act as they please: here 
and there, they use force against sovereign states (…) 
To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the 
necessary resolutions from international organizations, 
and if for some reason this does not work, they simply 
ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.” 
Accordingly, for Russia, Yanukovich is still the legiti-
mate president, because he has not been deposed con-
stitutionally. This de jure perspective precludes seeing 
him as delegitimized de facto. However, it is raison d’ état 
which explains what is more important when the con-
cern for the state is at odds with the concern for law: rea-
son of state prescribes that law can and must be broken 
if this serves the state’s interests. The key here is “neces-
sity”, which justifies the means.
Bio-Politics and the Compatriots abroad
Finally, an element of Russian foreign policy which 
has steadily gained importance is the concern Rus-
sia displays for its “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki), or 
in other words, the community of ethnic Russians in 
the Near Abroad, broadly conceived. Already under 
Yeltsin, efforts have been undertaken to develop a strat-
egy towards this group and, in 1999, Federal Law 99-FZ 
“On state policy toward compatriots living abroad” was 
passed. The law offers multiple and vague definitions, 
institutionalizing ambiguity about who can be con-
sidered a “compatriot”.7 Since then, the law has been 
amended several times, and the topic has regularly been 
raised by Russian politicians, adding to Russia’s for-
7 Oxana Shevel, Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in 
Postcommunist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011).
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eign policy a bio-political element. Bio-politics means 
that the population as a whole is considered in terms of 
being a political problem. Neither territory nor the state 
are the sole objects of power, rather, power’s attention is 
increasingly directed towards the population.
In 2005, Putin highlighted that the end of the 
USSR, “for the Russian people, became a real drama. 
Tens of millions of our citizens and countrymen found 
themselves outside Russian territory.” This issue was 
picked up again on March 18, 2014: “Millions of peo-
ple went to bed in one country and awoke in different 
ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former 
Union republics, while the Russian nation became one 
of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the 
world to be divided by borders.” The compatriots also 
figure prominently in the 2013 Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation. It underlines that “par-
ticular attention will be paid to providing support to 
compatriots living in the CIS Member States, as well 
as to negotiating agreements on the protection of their 
(…) rights and freedoms.”8
The defense of Russian citizens or russophone popu-
lations abroad became a key issue and a rationale for jus-
tifying the exertion of pressure on neighboring coun-
tries. The intervention in South-Ossetia in 2008 was 
explicitly made on the grounds of saving the lives of the 
sootechestvenniki. After hostilities had started, Dmitri 
Medvedev affirmed on August 8, 2008: “Civilians (…) 
are dying today in South Ossetia, and the majority of 
them are citizens of the Russian Federation. In accor-
dance with the Constitution and the federal laws, as 
President of the Russian Federation it is my duty to pro-
tect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever 
they may be.” With regard to Ukraine, Putin broad-
ened the concept of compatriots, and stated that there 
“live and will live millions of ethnic Russians, russophone 
citizens, and Russia will always defend their interests 
with political, diplomatic, and legal means.” Russia 
clearly allots to the former Soviet republics a special 
place in its foreign policy not only due to geographi-
cal proximity and resulting socio-economic ties, but 
because their populations include Russian or russo-
phone minorities, and thus actual or potential compa-
triots. In this light, it seems, the Kremlin displays an 
interest in the population of the CIS in the first place, 
and only then, in its territory. Russia reserves the right 
to intervene to protect this population with whom Rus-
sia claims to have “close historical, cultural and eco-
nomic ties. Protecting these people is in our national 
8 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 
12/02/2013, available at: <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76
389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D>
interests. (…) we cannot remain indifferent if we see 
that they are being persecuted, destroyed and humil-
iated”, as Putin underscored. Or, put more bluntly by 
Foreign Minister Lavrov, on April 23: “Russian citizens 
being attacked is an attack against the Russian Feder-
ation.” Such an interpretation of compatriots means 
that the current Russian foreign policy explicitly rec-
ognizes a mismatch between the sovereign territory of 
the Russian Federation and the population for which 
the regime claims responsibility.
Conclusions
It might be true, then, that raison d’ état and sovereignty 
are “more traditional” forms of power, but they are not 
outdated. It would be questionable to assume that they 
have been replaced and that, as Obama stated, “through 
centuries of struggle, through war and enlightenment, 
repression and revolution, (…) a particular set of ideals 
began to emerge” associated with a new type of (demo-
cratic) power. Russian and Western states’ foreign pol-
icy bears witness that there is not a series of successive 
elements of power in foreign policy, with new ones caus-
ing the older ones to disappear. History does not evolve 
linearly, and power is exercised simultaneously target-
ing the state, the territory, and the population. Hence, 
on the one hand, there are many continuities with the 
policies initiated by Primakov some eighteen years ago, 
which stressed state greatness and great power spheres of 
influence. The road to Crimea had, in this sense, already 
been sketched out.
However, there are some truly new elements: firstly, 
the Russian leadership’s interpretation of Russian iden-
tity has shifted increasingly to include a biopolitical con-
cern for the compatriots living in the post-Soviet space. 
This concern is coupled with a willingness to actually 
mobilize the military apparatus in order to protect the 
lives of the people considered to have “close historical, 
cultural and economic ties” with Russia. This readi-
ness had already become visible in 2008, when Russian 
troops rushed to assist South Ossetia
Secondly, in the case of Crimea, Russia went beyond 
this. Not only did it invade Ukrainian territory, but in 
an extremely swift legal procedure, went on to first rec-
ognize Crimea as an independent state (March 17) and 
then to incorporate it as part of the Russian Federation 
itself (March 21), circumventing constitutional limita-
tions that would have required Ukraine’s consent to let 
Crimea go, as stipulated by Federal Constitutional Law 
No. 6-FKZ. So, in contrast to South Ossetia and Abkha-
zia, Crimea became part of Russia itself. In both cases, 
however, control over territories inhabited by compatri-
ots was restored. Because of this mismatch between the 
territory of the Russian Federation on the one hand, and 
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the Russky mir9 or its “sphere of identity”, Russian foreign 
policy contains an expansionist potential aimed at pre-
serving influence over territories where compatriots live.
While the West was never fully willing or able to 
welcome Russia as equal partner, now some Western 
leaders have completely written-off the Putin regime.10 
The Russian leadership, for its part, increasingly gave up 
on the idea of Russia becoming a part of the West and 
“started creating their own Moscow-centered system”, as 
noted by Dmitri Trenin as early as 2006,11 turning its 
attention more and more towards Russian compatriots 
in the former USSR. The incorporation of Crimea into 
the Russian Federation seems to be the last nail in the 
coffin of Moscow’s Westernizers.
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ANALYSIS
Taking the Shortcut to Popularity: How Putin’s Power is Sustained through 
Ukraine
By Bo Petersson, Malmö
Abstract
Putin has built his popularity on two incongruent myths: that Russia is an eternal great power and that the 
country is beset by cyclical periods of weakness. Putin’s popularity stands in contrast to the lack of legiti-
macy within Russia’s overall political system. Recently, Putin has used Ukraine to revive his popularity as his 
term in power stretches well beyond a decade, but it remains unclear what the cost of these actions will be.
Russia as a Great Power
Speaking about the purportedly poor condition of state 
museums in Crimea, which in mid-March 2014 had 
been annexed to the Russian Federation by almost unan-
imous votes in both houses of the Russian parliament, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin lamented on April 10, 
“Ukraine has its own problems; it even had its own ide-
ology of development or, on the contrary, obliterating 
some of the common pages of our history. But what is 
entirely clear is that they need to be revived.”1 On the 
same day, marking the 70th anniversary of its libera-
tion from Nazi occupation, Putin issued a greeting to 
residents of the southern Ukrainian city of Odessa and 
to surviving WW II veterans there: “The President of 
Russia expressed his conviction that centuries-old tra-
ditions of good neighborliness and mutual support will 
continue to unite Russians and Ukrainians. He stressed 
that their common duty is to cherish the memory of the 
1 <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7001> (accessed 16 April 2014).
past war, to thwart any attempt to rewrite history and 
to bring up the younger generation on the high ideals 
of patriotism and pride for our Great Victory.”2
Seen in the context of the generally tense situation 
between Russia and Ukraine, Putin’s words could cer-
tainly be interpreted as ominous. The small components 
of the language he used, such as “the common pages of 
our history” that “need to be revived,” “unite Russians 
and Ukrainians,” “thwart any attempt to rewrite his-
tory” (what parts of history?) and “pride for our Great 
Victory” all had the same connotations: scarce recogni-
tion by Russia of the sovereignty of Ukraine, and instead 
profuse references to Ukraine as destiny-bound to com-
munity with great-power Russia.
In this article I argue that Putin’s strong promotion 
of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and his hardline stance 
against Ukraine are highly consistent with the basic 
2 <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7000#sel=3:1,3:64> (accessed 16 
April 2014).
